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This report has three goals.  First, summarize issues surrounding the measurement 
of achievement gains in college.  Second, discuss the possibilities and limitations of 
measuring these gains in Texas colleges using Texas Higher Education Coordinating 
Board data.  Third, empirically estimate achievement gains in the most precise way 
possible using available data. 
 
Discussion and Literature Review 
We begin with a discussion of achievement gains in Higher Education, and 
emphasize its inherent multidimensionality.  Colleges strive to impart different skills 
and knowledge to different students, and social as well as academic experiences are 
deemed valuable and desirable.  As such, the entire package of knowledge and skills 
acquired in college is inherently unobservable to an empirical researcher and is not 
easily comparable across students and schools.  We therefore study proxies for 
educational achievement that are available in the existing data. 
We devote considerable attention to the merits of various proxies for 
achievement.  Test scores, grades, and earnings can be used to measure what has 
been referred to in the literature as “value-added”, while college completion and 
persistence rates inform us of other aspects of educational achievement.  Test scores 
are an appealing proxy but pose significant methodological hurdles; furthermore they 
are not currently available.  Earnings are particularly attractive due to their 
theoretical link to labor market productivity and are readily available.  Persistence 
and completion rates are currently available and are indicative of certain aspects of 
achievement. 
We turn to review several econometric models that have been used to 
estimate value-added in the academic literature.  The choice of model depends 
crucially on the number of times the achievement measure is observed.  If it is 
observed both before and after college, as is often the case with test scores, the 
calculation is easy: simply difference the two measures.  If it is only observed once, 
as with earnings, we are faced with the dilemma of not knowing what level of 
educational attainment students had upon entering college, and hence how much 
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value was added.  In this case, which unfortunately applies to higher education in 
Texas, one must resort to more sophisticated statistical techniques to estimate 
achievement gains. 
As such, we discuss several statistical techniques that can be used when there 
is just one observation of achievement.  Broadly speaking, these techniques fall into 
two categories: 1) techniques that attempt to control for all factors jointly 
determining college choice and the measure of attainment (e.g. controlling for SAT 
scores and high school achievement), and 2) those that employ additional behavioral 
assumptions to make causal inference.  Methods of the former type suffer from the 
criticism that the researcher can never control for all confounding factors, such as 
parenting skills and innate student ability.  Hence, we recommend that the state use 
methods falling under the latter category. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
We conclude that the model developed by Dale and Krueger (2002) is the 
most appropriate for determining the causal impact of Texas colleges on their 
students.  Their framework explicitly models the college application and enrollment 
decision, making comparisons only between students who apply to and are accepted 
at the same set of colleges.  If we believe that similar students have similar 
application and acceptance profiles, then this method provides us ideal comparison 
groups to identify the causal impact of colleges on achievement gains.   
Using THECB data, we estimate the Dale and Krueger (2002) model with 
three different proxies for achievement: earnings, college persistence rates, and 
college completion rates.  Overall, the results indicate that once we control for 
selection into colleges there is very little difference in achievement gains across 
institutions in Texas.  That is, differences in the average earnings of students who 
enroll at UT Austin and Sul Ross State, for example, are mostly due to pre-existing 
differences in the types of students who enroll at those schools and not to differences 
the institutions themselves. 
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Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
We conclude with a general discussion of quantitative measures of achievement 
gains in higher education, addressing how the empirical analysis is relevant for 
educational policy and how these methods could be adapted for use in Texas.   Particular 
attention is paid to the issue of incentive compatibility – the idea that for an achievement 
gain measure to be used for policymaking purposes, it must not induce institutions to take 
perverse actions that simply inflate their scores without concurrent achievement gains.   
In the abstract, we conclude that indicators measuring achievement gains by 
individual colleges could be used meaningfully for policy making purposes.  Published 
annually, they could allow individual colleges to monitor their own progress and compare 
themselves to peer institutions.  Funding could also be tied to either the level of 
achievement gains within a school or to changes in that level to create incentives for 
schools to improve.  In practice, however, currently available value-added and 
achievement gain measures are not sufficient for these purposes – including the ones 
proposed in this report.  In short, they are simply too imprecise to make meaningful 
comparisons of achievement gains across institutions or over time.  We therefore make 
the following policy recommendations: 
 
1. At best, the methods used in this report for measuring achievement gains in 
institutes of higher education should be a starting point for further research.  
We do not recommend using these methods to institute an annual value-added 
ranking of colleges in Texas for monitoring purposes and we urge particular 
caution against using these methods to develop a “pay-for-performance” type 
policy.  We present some evidence that achievement gain differences across Texas 
colleges are small.  This, in and of itself, is important information that could - and 
likely should - be made public.  However, as the estimates are imprecise, we cannot 
in general distinguish the quality of one college over the other and we therefore 
believe it would be inappropriate to form policy using these methods.  Moreover, 
tying funding to such measures is tantamount to randomly allocating funds across 
colleges.  In future research, we plan to use more refined econometric techniques (i.e., 
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Instrumental Variables estimation) in an attempt to make achievement gain estimates 
more precise. 
 
2. We do not recommend the wholesale implementation of testing at the higher 
education level.  At first glance, standardized tests appear to be an ideal way to 
measure the entirety of the set of skills and knowledge acquired in higher education.  
But, upon closer inspection, it is unclear that a standardized test could be designed 
that would test both general and specific knowledge.  There are well designed exams 
of general skills, like the CLA, and there are appropriate exams for testing specific 
skills for some majors, like the ETS subject tests.  However, what is needed is a way 
to combine these two distinct aspects of educational achievement that is meaningfully 
comparable across students with vastly different goals and career plans. 
 
3. We do recommend the Coordinating Board explore other, more qualitative, 
methods to measure and increase achievement gains by schools.  One such 
method would be a program of institutional peer review.  Under such a program, the 
Board could set up an exchange of faculty members across colleges to sit in on 
classes, discuss teaching techniques with faculty in their field, and evaluate the 
academic goals and standards of the peer school.  Emphasis could be placed on 
sharing ideas for academic advancement and increasing the achievement gains of 
students while they are enrolled in higher education. 
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“Student achievement, which is inextricably connected to institutional 
success, must be measured by institutions on a “value-added” basis 
that takes into account students’ academic baseline when assessing 
their results. This information should be made available to students, 
and reported publicly in aggregate form to provide consumers and 
policymakers an accessible, understandable way to measure the 
relative effectiveness of different colleges and universities.” 
– Quote from “A Test of Leadership,” the Report of the Spellings 




This report, commissioned by the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board 
(THECB), has three main goals.  The first is to summarize key issues surrounding the 
measurement of the achievement gains of students in colleges, and the use of these 
measures to improve educational outcomes.  The second goal is to discuss the 
possibilities and limitations of measuring achievement gains in Texas colleges using data 
currently available at the THECB.  The final goal is to estimate achievement gains in the 
most precise way possible using available data.  Throughout, we strive to relate the 
theoretical discussion of the measurement and use of value-added and achievement gain 
measures to the practicalities of implementing these policies in Texas.  
We begin by outlining the two main reasons why achievement gain measures are 
of interest to practitioners of higher education.  First, there is a need to quantify the 
educational impact that colleges have on their students in a meaningful, unbiased, and 
comparable manner.  Such information is useful both to administrators as a feedback tool 
and to the general public to inform decisions about which college to attend.  Second, 
achievement gain measures can be used to institute incentivizing policies that aim to 
increase the achievement gains of their students1.  Such policies hold schools accountable 
for the increase in performance of their students, and are currently being discussed 
extensively in K-12 education. 
                                                 
1 We do not attempt to answer the normative question of how much knowledge or skill colleges should 
strive to impart on their students.  However, there is a strong academic debate as to the “optimal” level of 
knowledge a school should add – see, for example, Dwyer, et al. (2006). 
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Throughout this discussion, we are careful to distinguish between the concepts of 
assessment, achievement gain, and value-added.  Assessment is the measurement of some 
component of knowledge and skills at a single point in time.  Achievement gain is the 
increase in some component of skills over time.  Value-added is the increase in the entire 
skill set over a set time period.  The most transparent method of measuring achievement 
gains involves using a pre- and post-assessment of achievement and then simply 
differencing in the two measures.  Using this method, a measurement of achievement 
gains is also a value-added measure when the assessment used appropriately measures a 
student’s entire skill set.  Thus all value-added measures are achievement gain measures, 
but there are achievement gain measures that do not pass the bar for being measures of 
value-added.  Similarly, while value-added and assessment are intimately linked, they are 
fundamentally distinct concepts.   
The themes of assessment and accountability have salient parallels in the recent 
history of K-12 education, and research has shown that accountability policies can indeed 
increase value-added in these settings (Hanushek & Raymond, 2005; Carnoy and Loeb, 
2002).  We believe that assessment and accountability are no less important in higher 
education than they are in K-12 education; however, there are several important 
differences that render the wholesale importation of what has worked in primary 
education to higher education an impractical endeavor. 
First, colleges intend to impart different skills and knowledge on different 
students; nursing students learn vastly different skills than engineering students and this 
makes it difficult to measure achievement in a consistent manner across students and 
schools.  The difference between general skills, such as the ability to communicate and 
reason, and specific skills, such as nursing or engineering knowledge, plays an important 
role here.  Thus, in the context of higher education, achievement itself is student specific, 
and encompasses all of the skills and knowledge a student acquires during her college 
career.  It is an unobserved theoretical construct that is difficult, if not impossible, to 
measure in practice. 
 Therefore, we proceed to explore a series of quantitative metrics that one could 
use to assess achievement – standardized tests, grades (GPA), wages, persistence rates, 
and graduation rates.  We discuss the merits and limitations of each measure, both in 
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general and in the specific case of Texas.  While at first glance standardized tests may 
seem to be the most appropriate proxy for achievement, their use poses significant 
methodological and practical barriers stemming from the difference between general and 
specific skills.  Therefore, in general, they may be appropriate for measuring achievement 
gains, but not value-added.  Grades, on the other hand, are not standardized across 
institutions2 and hence are not a viable proxy for achievement.  Wages, however, are a 
particularly attractive proxy due to their direct link to labor market productivity and their 
ready availability at THECB.  Persistence and completion rates are also currently 
available.  However, as they do not fully reflect the knowledge and skills obtained during 
college, they are only appropriate for measuring achievement gains. 
We then turn to a discussion of the methods that can be used to measure 
achievement gains for a given achievement proxy.  The statistical techniques used 
critically depend on 1) which proxy measure is used, 2) when and how often the measure 
is observed, and 3) which students are observed.  If we can observe the proxy twice, once 
before entering college and again some time in the future, measuring achievement gains 
is a simple task; simply take the difference between the two measures.  When such data 
exists (e.g. if students are tested before and after entering college), this technique is ideal; 
we can estimate achievement gains at the individual level and this can be compared with 
other students within or across colleges.  A crucial caveat with using an imperfect proxy 
for achievement is that the quality of the achievement gain measure is directly related to 
the quality of the proxy.  Again, an achievement gain measure is only a measure of value-
added if the achievement proxy captures all components of knowledge and skills 
imparted by colleges.   
Unfortunately, proxies that can be measured at two time-points are rare, and there 
are no such proxies available at this time in Texas.  When we observe a proxy measure at 
just a single time point, as in the case of wages, persistence rates, and graduation rates, 
we are forced to deal with two additional issues:  1) we cannot observe the level of 
achievement upon entering college, and 2) students are not randomly assigned to 
colleges, but rather systematically choose which college to attend based on private 
information.  We devote considerable attention to these issues in the body of the report. 
                                                 
2 Some may argue grades are not standardized within an institution, across majors, either. 
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We proceed to discuss several econometric models designed to deal explicitly 
with the issues raised above, paying particular attention to the practicalities of 
implementing these models with existing data in Texas.  Finally, we estimate one 
particularly attractive model using actual THECB data.  A broad conclusion is that, on 
average, colleges vary little in their ability to produce achievement gains once selection 
into college is controlled for.  We conclude that measures of achievement gains or value-
added cannot be reliably used to create accountability systems in higher education along 
the lines of the programs in place in some K-12 schools. 
 
2 The Need for Achievement Gain and Value-Added Measures in Higher 
Education 
 
There are two main reasons why practitioners of higher education should be 
interested in the development of indicators of the achievement that is gained by their 
students.  First, such measures provide useful information about the quality of education 
provided by individual institutions.  By correcting for the difference in types of students 
choosing to attend particular colleges, achievement gain measures provide an unbiased 
college-ranking not on absolute achievement, but on relative achievement gains.  Such 
information can be used by administrators to monitor their progress relative to peer 
institutions and to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions aimed at increasing 
educational quality.  For example, if Texas A&M institutes a policy to increase 
completion rates of under-prepared matriculants, but does not see a concomitant rise in 
completion rates relative to either itself or to the University of Texas, then administrators 
at Texas A&M have reason to believe that the program is not succeeding.  Such 
information about educational quality is also immensely useful to the general public.   
Students and parents deciding which college to attend would know that the higher the 
achievement-gain indicator of an individual institution, the more they can hope to gain by 
attending that college.  Value-added and achievement gain scores could compliment, and 
in many ways clarify, the existing signals of college quality such as popular national 
rankings, research output of faculty, class-sizes, and physical inputs such as books, 
buildings, and computers.  
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 Second, state level value-added and achievement gain measures can be used to 
institute policies that increase achievement gains amongst their students.  For example, 
THECB might consider tying funding to an institution’s value-added score.  By holding 
institutions directly accountable for increasing the educational performance of their 
students, such policies incentivize effective teaching and force colleges to direct 
resources towards that goal. 
Much can be learned about value-added measures from other educational settings, 
and the past decade of research suggested that K-12 educators respond to the same work 
incentives as workers in the private sector.  Academic research on state-level 
accountability systems and the No Child Left Behind Act at the national level has also 
suggested that students may learn more when teachers and schools are held accountable 
for the performance of their students (Carnoy and Loeb, 2002; Hanushek & Raymond, 
2005).  Unfortunately for practitioners of higher education, a valid accountability system 
relies on a consistent, unbiased, and comparable method for assessing a students’ 
educational attainment at any point in time.  Given an adequate assessment of 
achievement at two points in time, the difference between them tells us the knowledge 
that was added to a student by her teachers and school.  If achievement gains are found to 
be too low, policies may then be implemented to give educators incentives to increase 
them, and provide consequences if they fail to do so. 
Several key differences, however, bar the wholesale importation of popular K-12 
accountability and assessment policies into higher education.  Foremost is the fact that 
colleges have a very broad educational agenda with different students learning vastly 
different skills and knowledge.  While the vast majority of third graders are on a similar 
academic track, learning long division and improving writing skills, there is wide 
variance in what knowledge is learned in the third year of college.  A student in the 
School of Education might be preparing for student teaching while a Chemistry student is 
spending the majority of her time in a laboratory.  While a single standardized test may 
come close to capturing achievement for third graders, it simply cannot do so in the 
context of higher education.  Thus, despite the ever-present need to assess student 
achievement and to hold professors and colleges accountable for their students’ 
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performance, we face a formidable task in developing an appropriate, quantitative value-
added measure suitable for that setting. 
 
3 Defining Achievement Gains and Value-Added in Higher Education – 
Specific vs. General Skills 
 
We define achievement gains as the increase in some component of academic 
skills and knowledge that colleges impart on their students.  For example, suppose that 
colleges administer a standardized test of general knowledge, like the CLA, before and 
after students enter college.  The difference in the two scores represents an achievement 
gain in general knowledge.  Only when the assessment used to measure achievement 
gains encompasses all components of academic skills and knowledge can we call the 
resulting achievement gain measure a measure of value-added.  More formally, we define 
value-added as the increase in all social and academic skills and knowledge that colleges 
impart on their students.  As such, value-added is student-specific and inherently difficult 
to measure.  For nursing students, value-added includes what is learned in the core liberal 
arts curriculum as well as practical nursing knowledge, like how to inject a vaccine and 
accurately measure a patient’s blood pressure.  For a math major, value-added is quite 
different; while it still encompasses the same core liberal arts curriculum, we do not care 
if a math major knows how to clean a bedpan; we do, however, hope that she completes 
college with a thorough understanding of proof-based logic. 
More generally, there are two main types of knowledge that an educational 
institution may seek to impart upon students - specific knowledge and general 
knowledge.  Specific knowledge is what one would learn in a major course of study.  In 
the previous example, nursing students learn how to inject a vaccine and math majors 
learn how to prove theorems.  These practical, major-specific skills are what allow 
students to specialize, increase their productivity, and ultimately increase their income.  
However, there is a strong consensus in the academic community that increased 
productivity not only stems from job-specific skills, but also from the more general 
ability to function in a complex and rapidly evolving economy (Dwyer, 2006).  These 
“general skills” include the ability to think critically, to communicate effectively, to 
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reason, and to interact with others.  The ubiquitous tradition in higher education of 
combining a core curriculum with a skill-specific major stands as a testament to the fact 
that both general and specific skills are important aspects of a students’ education. 
Given that colleges strive to impart different skills on different students, our task 
of measuring the value-added by specific schools is now much harder.  How are we to 
compare the human capital acquired by an engineering major to that acquired by an 
English major?  If the engineer has acquired more specific economic skills that will lead 
to a higher wage, does that mean that there was more value added to her than to the 
English major who goes on to head an NGO?  One can argue that every recipient of a 
bachelor’s degree should have the same set of basic general skills, much like the 
traditional view of the required knowledge of a high school graduate.  But does that mean 
that the engineer has less value added because she has fewer general skills than the 
English major who has fewer specific skills?   
 These questions, and the distinction between general and specific skills, must be 
kept in mind when choosing any metric to measure achievement gains in college.  This is 
the task we turn to in the next section. 
 
4 Potential Proxies for Achievement 
 
 We now discuss the advantages and disadvantages of various proxies that could 
be used to measure achievement gains in higher education.  In doing so, we discuss the 
availability of each measure in the state of Texas, and note the temporal and monetary 
costs of obtaining those measures that are not currently available. 
 
4.1  Tests 
The historical roots of value-added measures lie in testing.  First applied in the 
case of elementary schools, researchers used the year-to-year difference in test scores to 
proxy for the knowledge and skills gained by individual students.  This measure became 
known as value-added, and is the basis for numerous state-level accountability programs 
across the country.  Given the ubiquity of testing in primary and secondary schools, and 
the success of using annual tests to develop value-added measures in that setting, it is 
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natural to consider the use of test scores as a proxy for achievement in higher education.  
But given the preceding discussion, can this tradition of testing be extended to the realm 
of higher education?  In general, the answer to this important question depends on two 
factors:  1) whether the test is norm- or criterion-referenced, and 2) whether the skills 
measured are general skills, specific skills, or both.  
Norm-referenced standardized tests are expected to have a bell-shaped 
distribution of scores and no student is expected to be able to answer all questions on the 
exam.  The SAT is an example of a standardized, norm-referenced test and it is 
referenced to a random sample of 1994 test takers.  A criterion-referenced test is designed 
to test whether or not students have achieved a certain level of mastery over a given set of 
material; the Texas TAKS exam is an example of a criterion-referenced test.  While many 
students fail to achieve the set standard on the TAKS, many others answer all questions 
correctly. 
For our purposes, the main distinction between norm- and criterion-referenced 
tests is that a norm-referenced test distinguishes student skills much more accurately than 
a criterion-referenced test near the tails of the distribution of test-takers.  This poses a 
significant problem for achievement gain and value-added measures.  Since the typical 
student enrolling at UT Austin is near the top of the test score distribution for college 
matriculants, it is nearly impossible to use a criterion-referenced test to gauge how much 
UT students learn during their college careers.  Thus, if a test-based proxy for 
achievement was to be implemented, we recommend using a norm-referenced test.    
Now, consider the set of skills we desire to measure.  If policy makers wish to 
measure general skills, there are several nationally recognized norm-referenced tests to 
choose from – the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA), ACT’s Collegiate Assessment 
of Academic Proficiency (CAPP), and ETS’s Measure of Academic Proficiency and 
Progress (MAPP).  Each exam was developed and approved by well-trained educators 
and psychometricians and appear to be a valid proxy for the attainment of general 
knowledge and skills. 
However, if one wishes to test specific knowledge and skills, a fundamental 
problem is that specific knowledge is discipline-specific.  To accurately measure specific 
skills, the state must adopt an exam for each college major offered in the state.  There 
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must be a nursing test for nursing students and an engineering test for engineering 
students.  It is important to note that discipline-specific exams currently exist for some 
college majors. ETS has developed a series of Major Specific Tests, there are GRE 
subject tests for some majors, and some disciplines require licensure exams3.  
Unfortunately, none of these options comprehensively covers all college majors offered 
by schools in the state.  We believe the development of exams for every major would be 
impractical, requiring an excessive in investment of scarce resources. 
Each of the above types of exams is appropriate for measuring achievement gains.  
One can use a test of general skills, like the CLA, to produce a measure of achievement 
gains in general skills.  Similarly, one can use a test of specific knowledge and skills, like 
the GRE subject tests, to measure achievement gains in a particular discipline.  However, 
neither test alone can measure all components of knowledge and skills imparted by 
students, so neither type of exam can be used to measure value-added. 
Even if the state were to initiate a campaign to develop major-specific tests for all 
college majors, there are still considerable hurdles to overcome if the state hopes to use 
these exams to measure value-added.  First and foremost, the state would have to come 
up with an objective method to combine the scores from a general test with the scores 
from a specific test, and this is quite troublesome4.  In particular, different majors place 
different emphases on the relative importance of specific versus general skills.  
Engineering majors spend the majority of their academic career learning practical 
knowledge related specifically to their field; English majors learn how to think creatively 
and write persuasively – skills useful in a wide range of jobs and specializations.  How do 
we place an objective weight on the general and specific exam components when 
different majors place different weights on their relative importance?  Should we penalize 
an institution for instructing a teacher how to work with children while rewarding another 
for teaching a philosophy major how to reason to a logical conclusion? 
A further problem is that many students who enroll in college do not graduate.  
This poses a problem for testing as we hope to assess achievement before and after 
college, and it is unlikely that we would be able to test dropouts.  If those students who 
                                                 
3 See Yunker (2005) for an example related to CPA’s. 
4 Also, since not all colleges offer all majors, how do we compare one institution to another?  The state 
would have to come up with an objective way to overcome this issue as well. 
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would score lower on standardized exams are more likely to drop out, school-average 
value-added measures would be biased towards colleges with higher dropout rates.  In 
high drop-out schools, we only observe value-added for the best students, whereas in 
schools with lower dropout rates, we observe value-added for all students.  Given the 
above criticisms, we conclude that, at best, standardized tests can be used to measure 
achievement gains in general skills in higher education – they cannot be used to measure 
value-added. 
 
4.2  Grades 
Another natural measure one might consider using as a proxy for achievement is 
college grades or GPA.  Unfortunately, grades depend on the courses a student takes and 
are set by individual instructors, often based on a bell-curve of students in the class.  As 
such, they are not comparable within or across schools.  Is a “C” in Spanish Literature 
comparable to a “C” in Quantum Mechanics, even if both courses are taken at UT Dallas?  
Is an “A” in Calculus at UT Austin the same as an “A” in the Calculus at TAMU-
Commerce?  In both cases, the answer is most likely “No”.  Therefore, there is no way to 
ensure that differences in grades reflect meaningful differences in educational 
achievement and this renders student GPA a poor proxy for achievement in higher 
education. 
 
4.3  Wages 
There are several compelling reasons why wages might serve as an appealing 
proxy for achievement.  First and foremost, economic theory teaches us that in a free 
market, workers are paid in accordance with their contribution to the value of the good 
they produce.  The more a worker adds to the value of a final product, the higher her 
wage will be.  For example, an engineer that designs a car will be paid more than the 
factory worker that builds the car if the additional value added by the engineer is greater 
than that of the factory worker. Therefore, there is a theoretical argument for the use of 
wages as a proxy for human capital: wages signal productivity and productivity is the 
economic byproduct of the knowledge and skills learned in school. 
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Second, unlike tests, wages effectively combine the effects of both general and 
specific skills in a coherent and meaningful way - they are weighted in the manner that 
best reflects worker productivity.  A nursing major’s wages reflect his productivity in 
taking blood pressure and caring for his patients, while a political science major’s wages 
reflect her writing and reasoning skills.  Therefore, in a perfectly competitive labor 
market, any two workers with the same wage are equally productive; our nurse should be 
equally as productive as the political scientist provided the two are paid the same. 
Labor markets, however, are not perfectly competitive and the above conclusion 
will not be valid to the extent that frictions in labor markets exist.  For example, if 
workers are intrinsically motivated, as in the non-profit sector, then wages do not fully 
reflect productivity5.  Furthermore, wages are only observed for those who work and the 
social, non-academic aspects of achievement such as civic-mindedness are likely not 
reflected in wages.  Any empirical analysis must take this these caveats seriously, 
carefully controlling for avoidable biases and noting the effects of unavoidable biases.  
However, despite the drawbacks, we feel that the strengths outweigh the weaknesses and 
advocate the use of wages as a proxy for achievement.  Since wages measure both 
general and specific skills, they can be used to measure value-added.  Furthermore, 
quarterly wage data is currently available at the Coordinating Board for all college 
enrollees.  
 
4.4  Completion rates and persistence rates. 
A final set of proxies for achievement in higher education are college persistence 
and completion rates.  Whether or not a student persists in college is certainly of interest 
to policy makers.   What is unclear, however, is the extent to which eventually obtaining 
a college degree informs us of the general and specific skills that the student acquired 
while in college.  Furthermore, we cannot be sure that the standard for college completion 
is the same across institutions.  If courses are not as rigorous at UT Tyler as they are at 
UT Austin, should not the value of a degree from UT Austin be higher than that signaled 
by a degree from UT Tyler?  Using only persistence or completion rates ignores this 
                                                 
5 For the particular econometric method we use to estimate value-added, this is only a problem if these 
benefits or “warm glow” jobs vary systematically across colleges. 
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important distinction.  Thus, these measures are a useful, albeit weak proxy for 
achievement.  As such, they may be used to measure achievement gains, but not value-
added.  However, as they are readily available at the individual level at the THECB, we 
include them in our analysis.  
 
To summarize, many potential proxies for achievement in higher education exist, 
but none is perfect.  We limit our attention to those measures that can attribute some 
observable component of student achievement to the college they attend, and are that 
comparable across time and institutions.  Despite their ubiquitous use in K-12 education, 
the methodological issues surrounding the use of standardized tests in higher education 
are many.  Grades, or GPA, are not useful in creating achievement gain measures as they 
are not comparable across students, even within schools.  Wages are an attractive proxy 
for achievement. Given their theoretical link to labor market productivity, they are 
particularly attractive for value-added models.  However, as wages are not observed prior 
to entering college, any value-added measure derived from wages must carefully control 
for the “value” students had upon enrolling (we discuss this below).  Finally, completion 
and persistence rates can be useful, using the same methodology as used for wages, but it 
is unclear what component of achievement they capture. 
 
5 Statistical Methods for Measuring Achievement Gains and Value-added 
 
There are several well known statistical methods that can be used to measure the 
achievement gains of students in individual colleges, based on the proxies for 
achievement we have outlined above.  We discuss these below and throughout assume 
that data is available for all students in the state at the individual level, as it is at the 
THECB.6  First, however, we offer a hypothetical example to help illustrate the statistical 
problem we face.   
                                                 
6 If data is only available for a sub-sample of the population, or in aggregated form, any value-added 
analysis will, in general, be less precise.  Other methodological concerns, such as selection bias, must then 
also then be addressed.  We do not discuss these issues as they are not relevant for the THECB at this time, 
despite the fact that they have been significant barriers to other higher education value-added studies in the 
academic literature (Tracy and Waldfogel, 1995; Kreutzer and Wood, 2007; Berg and Kreuger, 2002; 
Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg, 1998). 
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Imagine students were randomly assigned to colleges in Texas, and we do not 
know the initial achievement level of students.  This would imply that within every 
college the average achievement level of the freshman class would be the same – even 
though we do not know initial achievement.  Imagine also that at some time in the future 
each student’s true level of educational achievement could be measured, and this measure 
was averaged over all students in the school.  Due to the random assignment into college, 
any differences in average achievement across schools could only be explained by the 
effect that the specific schools had on their students, as on average every school had a 
similar mix of student achievement in their freshman classes.  These average differences 
in achievement levels across schools are exactly how one would define achievement 
gains by the college when only the “after” measure of achievement is available.  For 
example, if the cohort of students who were randomly assigned to UT Austin had a 
higher average achievement level upon graduating than the cohort assigned to Sam 
Houston State, we could conclude with confidence that UT Austin did a better job of 
increasing the achievement of its students. 
The real world, however, departs from this hypothetical ideal in two ways.  First, 
we can not observe true achievement for every student, for all of the reasons discussed 
above.  Second, and more importantly, students are not randomly assigned to colleges.  In 
fact, the opposite is true in practice as students deliberately and systematically choose 
which school to attend, often for reasons unobserved by the researcher.  The statistical 
methods we discuss and employ below were specifically designed to circumvent this 
second problem – the selection problem – and approximate the hypothetical ideal of 
random assignment to colleges. 
While the scenario described above - when there is only an “after” measure of 
achievement - is the relevant case for higher education in Texas, we also discuss the 
measurement of value-added when both “before” and “after” observations are available 
for the sake of methodological completeness.   
 
5.1 Achievement gains with “before” and “after” observations of achievement 
 If “before” and “after” measures of achievement are available, we could simply 
difference the measures as an estimate of achievement gains.  For example, if the 
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achievement measure is a standardized test of general knowledge, one could administer 
the exam before students enroll and again upon graduating.  In terms of intra-personal 
assessment, this technique is ideal.  Schools would know how much knowledge was 
gained over the course of a student’s tenure in college, and this could be compared with 
other students in the school.7  Individual measures can then be aggregated to form 
institution-level achievement gain measures.  Again, these achievement gain measures 
are only value-added measures when the exam used for assessment can adequately 
measure all components of knowledge and skills that students learn in college. 
A serious issue, however, arises when college drop-out rates are high.  When a 
college enrollee fails to persist to graduation, her achievement level is only observed 
once, implying that she is omitted from institution-level averages.  Left unaccounted for, 
this type of selection bias tends to skew achievement gain measures in favor of those 
institutions with higher dropout rates.  Students who drop out would have likely had 
lower achievement upon graduating, so dropping these students from the achievement 
gain calculation would increase the school-level achievement gain estimate8.   
Given the paucity of testing data available in higher education, relatively few 
studies have actually employed this type of differencing methodology.  One that stands 
out is Yunker (2005), which measures the institution-level value-added of Certified 
Public Accountant (CPA) programs9.  He concludes that there is little difference across 
institutions in their ability to add value to accounting majors.   
 
5.2 Value-added with only one observation of achievement 
 When only one achievement measure is available, as with wages, we face the 
problem of not knowing the achievement level of a student was upon enrolling in college.  
For example, with wages we do not know how much a student would have earned if he 
                                                 
7 Note, however, the limitations that major-specific skills would place on the usefulness of such inter-
personal comparisons.  
8 For example, suppose Texas A&M and UT Brownsville had dropout rates of 8% and 25%, respectively.  
If a statistical analysis failed to correct for this difference, the A&M value-added score would be based on 
the top 92% of college enrollees while the UT Brownsville score will be based on the top 75% (assuming 
the lowest achieving students are the ones who drop out) and this inaccurately favors UT Brownsville. 
9 Using institution level averages, Yunker regressed school mean CPA exam scores on the mean SAT score 
for incoming accounting majors. The residual of this regression is an indicator of value-added.  Effectively, 
this method is equivalent to the differencing methodology outlined above. 
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had entered the work force directly after high school.  In this case, we cannot use the 
standard differencing technique; rather we must rely on sophisticated econometric 
techniques to account for selection into particular colleges10. Moreover, this setting is not 
ideal since it does not permit a within-school assessment of achievement gains; we can 
only compare achievement gains across institutions. 
Fortunately, there exists an array of methods to deal with these problems.  One 
class of methods attempts to explicitly control for all factors that jointly determine 
college choice and educational achievement – these encompass Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) and matching techniques.  The other methods can be loosely categorized as those 
that impose further theoretical assumptions on the relationship between college selection 
and achievement.  None of these methods is perfect, although they can be ranked in order 
of their usefulness.  OLS and matching type methods are inadequate as one can never 
observe all factors jointly responsible for college choice and the achievement, thereby 
leading to biased estimates (this is the omitted variable problem).  The second class of 
methods suffers from the caveat that they are only as good as the theoretical assumptions 
used to derive them. 
 
5.2.1 Simple methods to control for observables 
The first general class of methods used to control for selection into college are 
those that attempt to control for all factors correlated with both achievement and the 
decision of which school to attend.  Left unaccounted for, such confounders can bias 
achievement gain measures.  Two methods of this type have been employed to derive 
value-added measures in higher education:  ordinary least squares (Estelle, 1989; Tracy 
& Waldfogel, 1997; Kreutzer & Wood, 2007) and matching (Black & Smith, 2004)11.   
Generally speaking, if we as researchers are able to observe and control for all factors 
jointly determining college choice and achievement, then either of these methods is a 
perfectly valid method for determining achievement gains. 
                                                 
10 In practice, even most good studies using the differencing method also employ one or more of the 
techniques we discuss below.  In fact, Yunker (2005), which we discussed above, employs an OLS 
regression to correct for pre-existing differences in the types of students enrolling in particular CPA 
programs. 
11 The key difference between matching and OLS is that matching is a non-parametric method, while OLS 
imposes a specific functional form assumption.  Thus, matching is more general than OLS.  However, the 
generality comes at the price of less transparency in the exposition of estimation results.  
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Unfortunately, this is almost never the case.  Since we cannot observe these 
confounding factors, we are unable to control for them explicitly and hence, methods of 
this type are usually biased.  For example, suppose that students with educated parents 
are more likely to attend UT Austin over Texas A&M, and we do not observe parental 
education (as is the case with THECB data).  Furthermore, assume that students with 
educated parents are more likely to complete college.  If completion rates are used as the 
measure of achievement, then both OLS and matching would produce biased 
achievement gain estimates due to the influence of the unobserved, yet influential factor 
of parental education.  In particular, this scenario would overestimate the achievement 
gain of UT Austin because part of the estimated impact of enrolling at UT would be 
attributable to the unobserved influence of parental education. 
Despite this limitation, many researchers in higher education have used OLS and 
matching in the past.  The earliest such study is Estelle et al. (1989), which uses future 
earnings as an achievement measure and employs OLS to estimate the value-added by 
colleges.  They find that private colleges on the East Coast have higher value-added than 
other colleges.  Two more recent studies replicate this methodology in different higher 
educational settings - Tracy and Waldfogel (1995) in the context of MBA programs, and 
Kreutzer and Wood (2007) for undergraduate business schools.  Both studies find 
significant differences in their estimated value-added rankings relative to an alternative 
ranking based on raw earnings of graduates.  In a unique study, Black and Smith (2004) 
compare the results of OLS value-added models to matching models, and recommend the 
use of matching due to a key assumption of the OLS model not being satisfied. 
We believe that measures based on either OLS or matching should be viewed, at 
best, as an intermediate step between a college ranking system based on raw average of 
the achievement measure (i.e., a pure ranking of average wages of graduates) and the 
hypothetical ideal of an achievement gain measure based on random assignment to 
colleges.  Thus, while these methods can be implemented in the state of Texas, we do not 
recommend doing so for policymaking purposes, and offer a superior alternative below. 
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5.2.2 Advanced methods for causal inference 
A set of more advanced methods for causal inference employ added behavioral 
assumptions to implicitly control for factors that jointly determine college choice and 
achievement.  These methods fall into three categories12.  First, selection models (Brewer 
et al., 1998) and instrumental variables (IV) models (Behrman et al., 1996) control for 
selection by positing a specific model governing college choice.  Second, data envelope 
techniques (Cegniz & Yuki, 1998; Fisher et al., 2008) assume optimizing behavior by 
institutions.  Finally, Dale and Kreuger (2002) develop a theoretical model of college 
choice which implies that all selection can be captured by a student’s college application 
and acceptance profile.  We discuss each of these techniques in some detail, describing 
the possibilities and limitations of implementing each in the state of Texas.  However, we 
conclude that the Dale and Kreuger (2002) model is the most appropriate and use it in the 
empirical section below. 
 
5.2.2.1 Explicitly modeling the selection process 
Both selection models and IV techniques control for selection by positing a 
particular functional form for the selection process.  In the present context, this simply 
means that the researcher must specify a formal relationship describing the college choice 
process.  Selection models require the researcher to make a specific functional form 
assumption for the error term in the selection equation, while IV models require that at 
least one determinant of college choice – called the instrument - is independent of the 
measure of achievement except through its influence on college choice.  For example, if 
we believed that students with educated parents were more likely to attend UT Austin, 
but that parental education does not otherwise influence future wages, then parental 
education is a valid instrument for college choice, and we can estimate the causal impact 
of college choice on wages, our proxy for the value-added by UT Austin. 
                                                 
12 The vast majority of past studies have used wages or earnings as the value proxy.  Due mostly to data 
quality issues, these studies have limited the scope of analysis to the return to “college quality,” as opposed 
to individual colleges per se.  Colleges are typically grouped together and researchers ask whether there is 
any causal difference in earnings of graduates of colleges across groups.  For example, do graduates of Ivy 
League schools earn more than they would have if they had attended a flagship state college instead?  Due 
to the tremendous data resources available in Texas, we are able to generalize this methodology to estimate 
the return to each particular college.  As far as we know, we are the first to attempt this type of exercise. 
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An advantage of selection models over IV models is that they do not require the 
use of an instrument.  Instruments are difficult to justify in practice; it is hard to find a 
variable that has no impact on the achievement measure, and there is no way to test 
whether the necessary relationship holds or not.  On the other hand, the functional form 
assumption required in a selection model is often chosen in an ad hoc manner, thereby 
reducing its credibility. 
Brewer et al. (1998) use Lee’s (1983) selection model to estimate the impact of 
college quality on earnings, using a conditional logit for the selection equation.  Overall, 
they find that college quality has a positive impact on earnings and that this impact is not 
as large as the raw difference in earnings that does not account for selection.  While this 
method could be applied to colleges in Texas, the Brewer model is difficult to understand 
and computationally burdensome.  We believe that any achievement gain model should 
be straightforward - if institutions do not understand how to improve their achievement 
gain score, then they tend not to respond to incentives to do so.  We therefore do not 
recommend the use of this model. 
Behrman et al. (1996) use an IV model to isolate the causal impact of college 
quality on earnings.  Their findings are similar to Brewer et al. (1998) – college quality 
has a positive impact on earnings, but a smaller impact than what is implied by raw 
earnings difference across colleges of different quality.  Again, we do not recommend 
using an IV strategy in Texas because 1) no plausible instrument for college choice is 
readily available, and 2) like selection models, IV models are not transparent to 
institutions, rendering any achievement gain rankings based on them less useful. 
 
5.2.2.2 Explicitly modeling the production process 
Alternatively, one could control for selection by explicitly modeling the 
educational production process, a technique commonly referred to as Data Envelope 
Analysis.  Modeling the production process requires specifying all of the goals – 
educational and research based alike – that colleges seek to achieve, as well as the factors 
such as salaries and tuition levels that constrain institutional decision making.  
Furthermore, the researcher must specify the process by which colleges make decisions; 
typically the assumption is that colleges optimize an objective function.  An obvious 
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drawback to this approach, however, is that there is no single common objective for 
colleges and universities.   
Two studies - Cegniz & Yuki, (1998) and Fisher et al. (2008) - use data envelope 
analysis to estimate the value-added of MBA programs.  Both studies find that the value-
added rankings change considerably after controlling for selection.  However, it is 
important to note the differences between MBA programs and traditional liberal arts 
colleges. 
While data is available to employ this method for Texas colleges, we do not 
recommend its use.  Data envelope analysis is only applicable to settings where the 
production process is known – such as in a factory, or to some extent, a business school.  
In higher education more generally, it is unclear what factors enter an institution’s 
objective function, or even if institutions seek to maximize some objective function at all.  
On top of this strong criticism, data envelope analysis is not very transparent and it is 
unclear what factors actually drive the rankings, so institutions would again not know 
how to improve their performance. 
 
5.2.2.3 Explicitly modeling the college application process 
A final method that has been used to mitigate the selection problem is to explicitly 
model the college application and acceptance process.  Dale and Krueger (2002) develop 
a theoretical model of the decision faced by a college applicant.  When this student 
decides where to apply to college, she considers all of the information she knows about 
herself and chooses the optimal set of colleges to apply to.  Some of the information she 
used in her decision, like SAT scores and income, is observable to the researcher.  
However, much of it, like motivation and desired career path, is not observed.  Dale and 
Kreuger’s insight is to recognize that as researchers we often observe students’ 
application and acceptance profiles and that this data contains all of the personal 
information the student and colleges used to make their choices, even the information that 
the researcher can not observe directly.  Thus, by comparing only students with identical 
application profiles, we can go a long way towards correcting for selection into college.13 
                                                 
13 This does not fully correct for selection, however, as amongst students with identical application and 
acceptance profiles we do not know why different students ultimately chose different schools.   
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Dale and Krueger (2002) use this methodology to determine the labor market 
return to college quality, where college quality is determined by the mean SAT scores of 
incoming freshmen.  While they find significant returns to college quality, the returns are, 
as expected, not as large as the raw differences in earnings across colleges of different 
quality.  
In many ways, the Dale and Krueger methodology is ideal for the empirical 
question posed in this paper.  The largest criticism of this method is that the identification 
is only valid if all students apply to college in a rational way.  Otherwise, a student’s 
application decision does not fully capture the unobservable variables that also impact the 
attainment measure in question.  However, the restrictions placed on behavior are 
certainly weaker than those required in the other models we have considered above.  
Moreover, the state already collects data on college application and acceptance behavior 
for all students, so no extra data collection is necessary.  Finally, the methodology is 
straightforward, easy to understand, and relatively easy to implement.  For these reasons, 
we recommend that the state use the Dale and Krueger (2002) methodology if it decides 
to develop achievement gain and value-added measures for Texas public colleges, and we 
use this technique in the following empirical exercise. 
 
 
6 Empirical Analysis of Achievement Gains and Value-Added by Texas Public 
Universities 
 
We turn now to an empirical analysis of the achievement gains and value-added 
by Texas four-year public Universities.  Of primary interest is whether individual 
colleges vary in their ability to increase the achievement of their students.  Towards this 
end, we estimate econometric achievement gain models and produce rankings of schools 
based on the outcomes of these models.  Despite the wealth of individual-level data 
housed at THECB, the scope of the analysis is limited by the measures of achievement 
that are currently available.  We thus concentrate on three such measures: earnings, 
persistence rates, and graduation rates.  Based on the previous discussion, all three of 
these measures can be considered measures of achievement gains, but only those based 
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on earnings can be considered value-added measures.  Our analysis shows that certain 
schools do vary in ability to increase the achievement of their students, but that the 
variation is slight.   
We begin with a description of the data, giving considerable attention to the use 
and availability of specific THECB databases.  A description of the intuition behind each 
econometric model follows.  The empirical results are then presented, along with the 
implied achievement gain rankings, and we conclude with a general discussion of the 
results and policy implications. 
 
6.1 Data 
Several secure, individual-level databases housed at the THECB offices in Austin, 
Texas are used in this analysis.  Combined, they track the universe of Texas public high 
school graduates through Texas colleges and into the workforce, and can be linked to each 
other and across time using Social Security Numbers.  For this empirical exercise, we 
construct a longitudinal panel of the 1998 and 1999 cohorts of Texas public high school 
graduates.14   
While college-level data is reported directly to the Coordinating Board by Texas 
colleges and universities, high school level data, wage data, and testing data is reported first 
to other agencies, and then shared with THECB.  The Student Report, the Graduation Report, 
and the Application Report are reported by all Texas colleges directly to THECB for the 
years 1998-2007.  Along with several demographic variables, the Student Report includes 
semester credit hours attempted and declared major for every institution a student attended.  
The Application Report identifies which public institutions a student applied to and was 
accepted at during the report year, while the Graduation Report indicates any degrees earned 
during the report year. 
The Texas Education Association (TEA) requires Texas public high schools to report 
data on all their students.  They have shared some of this data with the THECB for the years 
1991-2007, including a yearly report containing, for each graduate, demographic variables, 
an indicator for the high school of graduation, and a list of all academic courses taken during 
                                                 
14 We use the 1998 and 1999 cohorts so that there is ample time (at least 8 years) for students to both 
complete college and enter into the workforce, at which time we believe their wages will be indicative of 
value-added in college. Data for earlier cohorts is not available.  
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grades 9-12.  The Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) collects earnings data on all 
employed persons in the state, and have shared it with the THECB from the first quarter of 
1998 through the second quarter of 2007.  These reports include total quarterly nominal 
earnings for each job a person held. 
SAT and ACT test scores are purchased annually by the THECB from the 
corresponding testing agencies.  The Board currently has scores from SAT tests taken 
between 1998 and 2004, and ACT scores for the years 1998 and 1999.  In addition to test 
scores, the SAT database includes demographic information self-reported by the test taker on 
the day of the exam – household income, the educational attainment of each of the test takers 
parents, planned college major, and planned level of educational attainment.  Unfortunately, 
the ACT databases do not have this additional demographic information. 
Lastly, we use the 1997 County and City Data Book from the US Census to assign 
several indicators of local labor market conditions to each student15.  This data is not 
housed at the THECB, but can be found at the Geospatial and Statistical Data Center at 
the University of Virginia Library (http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/).   
 
6.2 Construction of Sample 
We begin by identifying all 1998 and 1999 graduates of Texas public high schools who 
enroll in the Texas Public University System in the year following graduation – 
approximately 82,000 students.16   From this group, the sample is further restricted in several 
ways in order to identify achievement gain differences across institutions.  First, college 
enrollees that do not have a valid SAT or ACT score are excluded.  Since most Texas public 
colleges require one of these tests as a condition for enrolling, this restriction only excludes 
5,773 of the original sample.  Second, 1501 graduates of high schools located in 13 largely 
rural counties are excluded as there is no data on local labor markets for these areas.  The 
next restriction stems from the preferred empirical strategy employed in the analysis (that of 
Dale and Kreuger, 2002) – we exclude 10,613 students who applied to more than 3 Texas 
public colleges and whose application/acceptance profile do not exactly match at least 9 
other enrollees in the sample.  Finally, when using earnings as an outcome measure, the 
                                                 
15 Students are assigned the labor market variables of the county in which he or she went to high school. 
16 As any student may be enrolled in more than one college in a given year, we assign each student to the 
college or university at which he or she attempted the most credit hours during that year. 
 28 
sample is restricted to include only college enrollees who 1) have completed their schooling, 
2) are in the Texas labor force, and 3) earned at least $2000 in the fiscal year beginning 8 
years after graduating high school – 19,648 observations. 
Therefore, two separate samples are used, with 45,657 observations in the earnings 
models and 65,305 observations in the persistence and graduation rate models.  With sample 
sizes this large, there is ample statistical leverage to expose differences in achievement gains 
across colleges, if these differences exist.  Summary statistics for both of these samples are 
presented in Table 1.  Note that for the “earnings” sample, earnings, graduation, and 
completion rates are higher than in the “persistence and graduation rate” sample.  This, 
however, is by design – only students earning more than $2000 a year are included in the 
“earnings” sample.  It also seems reasonable that students earning less than $2000 per year 
would also be the least likely to persist though and complete college, driving the observed 
differentials across samples.  Furthermore, students in both samples tend to be more 
academically prepared and have higher SAT scores than the state as a whole (not shown).  
For example, the mean SAT score in the earnings sample is 1026, considerably higher than 
the state average of 994.  This, again, is by design.  Our samples include only enrollees at 
four year colleges as opposed to SAT takers at large, and we therefore expect them to have 
higher SAT scores and be more academically prepared, on average, than students who take 
the SAT and fail to enroll. 
 
6.3 Methodology 
Three distinct sets of achievement gain rankings are produced, one for each measure 
of achievement identified above: earnings, college completion rates, and college persistence 
rates.  While none of these is an ideal measure, each identifies different, and important, 
aspects of the college-going process.  Identification of the variance across colleges in the 
ability to produce achievement gains is difficult, mainly due to the selection problem 
discussed above.  Our preferred methodology controls for selection of students into schools 
in the most comprehensive manner possible; however, it is instructive to see how this process 
works.  For each outcome, we therefore produce three sets of college rankings, sequentially 
adding more controls for student selection into college.  (These rankings can be seen in tables 
2 through 4.) 
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The first ranking – the “Unconditional Ranking” – simply lists the 30 Texas colleges 
according to the average of the outcome measure.17  This naïve approach ignores the 
selection problem completely.  As an example, if using this procedure UT Austin is ranked 
above Angelo State because, we would conclude that 8 years after enrolling students at the 
former earn more on average than those at the latter.  Clearly, this method is fraught with 
problems, chief among them being the selection issue – different colleges attract different 
types of students who come to college with different levels of preparation and academic 
skills.  This “selection problem” must be overcome if we are to accurately rank colleges in 
their ability to produce achievement gains. 
The second ranking – or the “Conditional Ranking” – uses Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) to explicitly control for student-level, observable characteristics that may influence 
collegiate choice.  We control explicitly for a large set of observable student-level 
characteristics that may impact the outcome of interest and are also correlated with college 
choice.  However, OLS ignores the unobservable characteristics (like parental influence and 
ability) that likely play an important role in college choice.  Continuing with our example, 
imagine the only difference between freshmen at UT and Angelo State is the fact that UT 
students have higher SAT scores.  In this case, the Conditional Ranking would fully account 
for selection as we control explicitly for SAT score in the model.  However, if UT students 
are also more likely to come from families with more involved parents, then the Conditional 
Ranking will be biased as we do not observe parenting skills and thus can not control for 
them.  As such, the Conditional Ranking represents an intermediate step that controls for 
many, but not all, of the factors that simultaneously determine college choice and 
achievement measures. 
The final, and preferred, “Matched Applicant” ranking goes a long way towards 
controlling for the unobservable confounds that can bias the Conditional Rankings model by 
employing the Dale and Kreuger (2002) methodology.  This procedure is identical to the one 
used in the Conditional Ranking except that it further controls for the full application-
acceptance profile of each college enrollee.  In essence, this procedure only compares 
students who applied and were accepted to the exact same set of colleges.  For example, 
                                                 
17 The only minor exception is that the rankings based on earnings also condition upon labor market 
experience, as is common practice in the labor economics literature.  See Mincer (1973) for more details.   
These conditional averages are therefore obtained using an OLS regression. 
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suppose Student A applied only to Texas Tech, Texas State, and Texas A&M, and she was 
accepted only at Texas Tech and Texas State.  In this case, Student A would only be 
compared to other students who applied to Texas Tech, Texas State and Texas A&M, and 





Column 1 of Table 2 presents the Unconditional Ranking based on earnings as a 
measure of achievement.  The coefficient for any school represents the percentage difference 
in annual earnings for a typical student from that school relative to a typical student from 
Texas A&M18.  For example, the typical enrollee at UT Austin (#2 in the Unconditional 
Ranking) earns 8.3% less than the typical Texas A&M enrollee, 8 years after high school 
graduation.  The double asterisk on this coefficient indicates that the estimate is statistically 
significant (from the implied “zero” coefficient on Texas A&M) and thus precise enough that 
it is likely not attributable to chance.   
There are several points to note.  First, there is considerable variance in raw earnings 
across colleges.  Students from the top-ranked school, Texas A&M, earn 63.4% more on 
average than students with similar labor market experience who instead enrolled at the 
bottom-ranked school, Texas Southern University.  Second, this method ranks schools 
similarly to the “popular” rankings published in the U.S. News and World Report and 
Barron’s Magazine.  This similarity should not be surprising as these popular rankings do not 
control for the selection problem either.  The highest ranked schools in the Unconditional 
Ranking – UT Austin, Texas A&M and UT Dallas – are the three most selective public 
universities in the state. 
 Conditional Rankings for earnings are listed in column 2 of table 2.  In this model we 
control for the following observable factors: demographic characteristics, SAT scores, high 
school curriculum, initial college major, local labor market conditions, and high school level 
characteristics. Each school’s coefficient estimate represents the percentage difference in 
                                                 
18 The choice of reference school – here, we chose Texas A&M - is arbitrary and does not affect the 
rankings or the interpretation of the coefficient estimates. 
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annual earnings for a student of that school relative to a student who is identical in terms of 
the observable characteristics but instead initially enrolled at Texas A&M.  As such, the 
typical student who enrolled at UT Austin earned 6.7% less than an observationally 
equivalent student who enrolled at Texas A&M.  Note that while these rankings are quite 
similar to the Unconditional Rankings, estimated differences in earnings across schools are 
now much smaller – the correlation coefficient between the Unconditional and Conditional 
rankings is 0.88, and the top- and bottom-ranked colleges remain the same.  However, the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimate for the bottom school, Texas Southern University, 
drops from 0.634 to 0.37 - a 42 percent decline.  This indicates that approximately 42% of 
the difference in earnings for Texas Southern University and Texas A&M students is 
accounted for by the observable variables that are included in the Conditional Rankings 
model. 
Lastly, column 3 of Table 2 presents the Matched Applicant Rankings.  Coefficient 
estimates represent the average increase or decrease in earnings students would have had if 
they had instead attended Texas A&M.  Using our familiar example, this implies that a 
typical student enrolling at UT Austin would earn 3.8% less than if she had instead chosen to 
enroll at Texas A&M.  Importantly, however, this estimate is not statistically different from 
zero, and therefore is not precise enough to determine if the observed earnings differential is 
actually due to differences between UT and A&M or simply due to chance.  To the extent 
that earnings fully capture college quality, these Matched Applicant Rankings are our best 
estimate of achievement gains of individual colleges in Texas.  Moreover, since earnings 
come close to fully capturing the knowledge and skills imparted by colleges to their students, 
these measures can be considered measures of value-added.   
Several points are again important to note.  First, the Matched Applicant coefficients 
are even smaller than the Conditional Ranking coefficients, with the range dropping from 
0.37 to 0.29.  Second, coefficient estimates are rarely significantly different from zero, which 
implies that differences across colleges in their ability to add value are slight or nonexistent.  
Therefore, most of the difference in earnings across Texas colleges is due to the types of 
students that attend those schools, and not due to the quality of education they receive.  
Lastly, the ordering of schools according to the Matched Applicant Rankings are very 
different from either the Unconditional or Conditional Rankings.  However, as coefficient 
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estimates are most likely not significant from one another, rankings based on these imprecise 
estimates do not have substantive meaning. 19  For example, one can not be sure that the top-
ranked Texas A&M at Galveston actually adds more value than most of the other schools, 
except possibly for those at the bottom of the ranking list, as the estimates are statistically 
indistinguishable from one another.   
 
Persistence and Graduation Rates 
The above analysis is repeated using 1-year persistence rates and graduation rates as a 
measure of achievement and the resulting rankings are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  For the 
most part, we find similar patterns to when earnings were used as a measure of attainment.  
As we move rightwards across the columns, adding successively more controls for both 
observable and unobservable characteristics, absolute differences in outcomes across schools 
diminish.  Also as with earnings, when moving from the conditional rankings to the matched 
applicant rankings, the ordering of schools changes drastically and overall differences 
between schools become less precise.  It is important, however, to keep in mind that 
persistence and graduation rates measure very different things than do earnings and our 
interpretation of the resulting rankings should take these differences into account.  More 
importantly, since these measures do not fully capture the growth in all components of 
knowledge and skills, they can only be considered measures of achievement gains; they 
should not be interpreted as measures of value-added. 
 
7 Policy Discussion 
 
 We proceed to a general policy discussion of achievement gains and value-added 
in higher education.  We address the ways in which the empirical analysis above is 
relevant to educational policy, and note how elements of these methods would have to 
change if the Coordinating Board were to use them for specific policy purposes. 
 
Uses for achievement gain and value-added measures 
                                                 
19 As coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant from zero, they are likely to be insignificant from 
each other as well.  However, we would have to perform pair-wise hypothesis tests to prove this statement 
conclusively. 
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Two reasons can be identified as to why achievement gain and value-added 
measures may be desirable in higher education: external, cross-institution comparisons at 
any point in time and internal institutional evaluation over time.  In terms of external 
comparisons, common knowledge of the distribution of achievement gain and value-
added measures across colleges may increase competition within the higher education 
sector.  For example, consider two schools with similar resources and incoming students 
– Texas Tech and the University of Houston.  If Texas Tech is less able to increase 
achievement than is the University of Houston, and this is common knowledge amongst 
students, parents, policy makers, then Texas Tech should feel pressure to increase its 
performance to match, or exceed, that of UH. 
In relation to internal evaluation, it is instructive for institutions to know the size 
of the achievement gains of their students and how these gains are changing over time.  
Such information would help Texas Tech, for example, to monitor progress towards its 
goal of increasing achievement gains.  Certain policies Texas Tech employs will work 
and others might not, and changes in achievement gains would measure the effectiveness 
of the policy in accomplishing its goal.  
 
Caveats in using achievement gain and value-added measures for Policy Formation 
Despite the obvious desirability of achievement gain and value-added measures, 
three issues must be understood and addressed before they are used to form policy.  First, 
assumptions made in estimating achievement gains and value-added may not, in fact, be 
valid.  Of particular concern is the assumption that the achievement gain methodology 
controls for all unobserved factors that simultaneously influence both the attainment 
measure of study and the choice of school to attend.  The Dale and Krueger (2002) 
model, by making comparisons only between students who applied to and were accepted 
at the same set of colleges, mitigates this concern somewhat, but there are likely 
confounding factors that will produce biased estimates of achievement gains and we can 
only hope that this bias is indeed small. 
A second caveat is that for the matched-applicant rankings to represent true value-
added, the outcome considered must fully capture the entire set of social and educational 
skills and knowledge that colleges impart on their students.  Otherwise, specific outcome 
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measures will only isolate the causal impact of college on a subset of the components of 
achievement.  As seen in the empirical results, achievement gain rankings across colleges 
differ widely when different outcomes are used (wages, completion rates, or persistence 
rates).  These rankings are re-displayed in Table 5 for easier comparison.  As is evident, 
some schools are better at increasing earnings while others are better at getting students 
to complete college.  However, since earnings is the only achievement measure that 
captures all components of knowledge and skills, only the results based on earnings 
should be considered true value-added measures. 
The final caveat is that even if we believe that the achievement gain rankings 
actually measure what they purport to do, the resulting estimates must be estimated 
precisely.  Otherwise, we cannot tell whether there is simply no difference in 
achievement gains across colleges, or whether there actually is a difference, but our 
estimates are too noisy to detect it.  In the above analysis controlling for selection into 
college, we nevertheless find that differences in achievement gains across colleges are 
small.  Further detailed statistical analysis is needed to determine whether these small 
differences are statistically different from one another, and therefore can have substantive 
meaning for policy formation.20   
 
Using Achievement gains and Value-added measures for Accountability and Monitoring 
Caution must also be exercised if achievement gains or value-added measures are 
to be used for accountability and monitoring purposes.  For one, the chosen achievement 
gain measure must respond to policies in a timely manner; otherwise, institutions will not 
be able to productively increase achievement gains in the short term.  This issue is 
especially salient when earnings are used as an achievement measure, since we believe 
that only wages of students sufficiently absorbed in the labor market are accurately 
indicative of the skills and knowledge acquired in college.  In our analysis, we use wages 
8 years after initial college enrollment, and we caution against using a shorter time 
period.  Using an achievement gain measure with such a long time-lag in responsiveness 
to institutional interventions would significantly reduce incentives for individual schools 
to increase achievement.  Thus, achievement gain measures employing earnings as the 
                                                 
20 We plan to conduct these statistical hypothesis tests in future work. 
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assessment measure are less useful for the purposes of short-term accountability and 
monitoring. 
Some have suggested using achievement gain or value-added measures as a basis 
for an incentive pay policy, whereby institutional funding is tied directly to the 
achievement gains of their students.  This mechanism is currently being used in some K-
12 school districts, and is an ubiquitous feature of any for-profit business model.  Pay for 
performance policies are intended to incentivize institutions to maximize achievement 
gains; however, tying funding to achievement gains may also create perverse incentives 
to “game the system.”  That is, if schools know how the state is measuring achievement 
gains, they may find it in their best budgetary interest to act in a manner that increases 
their achievement gain ranking even if their actions do nothing to actually increase the 
true achievement gains of their students.  For example, if the achievement gain measure 
is based on college completion, institutions should realize that by lowering graduation 
standards to allow more students to graduate, they would increase their funding.  Such 
actions would improve the schools ranking – hence, increasing their funding - but would 
also quite likely decrease true achievement gains of students. 
To prevent such perverse behavior, a pay-for-performance policy must use an 
achievement gain measure that satisfies two conditions, and hence be deemed “incentive 
compatible.”  The measure must 1) be a value-added measure and 2) fully account for 
selection into colleges.  If condition 1 were met, the incentive problem in the example 
above would be mitigated and “gaming the system” would not be feasible.  Condition 2 
assures that schools cannot alter their achievement gain score by changing their 
admissions policies.  If the achievement gain measure does not fully account for 
selection, then institutions would have the incentive to be more selective and only admit 
those students that inflate their value-added scores. 
Are the empirical achievement measures we derived above “incentive 
compatible?”  As evidenced by the preceding example, those based on completion and 
persistence rates surely violate condition 1.  The extent to which achievement gain 
measures based on earnings violate condition 1 is less obvious.  Earnings reflect labor 
market productivity, so incentivizing policies designed to increase graduate earnings 
should be tantamount to rewarding policies that make students more productive workers.  
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While we certainly desire college graduates to be productive workers, we also would like 
for them to be productive citizens – and earnings do not capture this component of 
knowledge and skills.  The extent to which our achievement gain measures violate 
condition 2 hinges crucially on whether or not we believe students apply to college in an 
optimal manner.  If so, then our matched applicant model fully captures selection into 
college, and condition 2 holds for all three outcomes.   
Finally, it is a separate question as to whether or not schools will actually take 
advantage of the opportunity to game the system.  We would hope that social norms and 
pro-social behavior would mitigate the problem, but given that this type of behavior has 
been observed in response to poorly designed accountability measures in K-12 education 
(see, for example, Figlio & Getzler (2002)), it is crucial to be cognizant of the problem 
and eliminate perverse incentives to begin with. 
 
8 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations  
 
This paper has addressed three main goals.  The first was to summarize the issues 
involved in the measurement of achievement gains in college.  The second was to discuss 
the possibilities and limitations of measuring this value-added in Texas colleges using 
data currently available at the THECB.  The third was to carry out empirical estimates in 
the most precise way possible using the data available at the THECB.  
We began by distinguishing between the concepts of achievement gains and 
value-added:  achievement gains are the increase in some component of skills and 
knowledge over a given period of time, while value-added is the increase in the entire set 
of skills and knowledge over a given period of time.  From a methodological standpoint, 
this definition poses two key problems for measuring value-added.  First, true value-
added is inherently unobservable to the researcher, and we thus only observe imperfect 
proxies.  Second, value-added in higher education is individual specific and difficult to 
compare inter-personally.  This observation stems from the differences between specific 
and general skills that are learned across different college majors and institutions.  We 
continued by discussing the relative merits of several potential proxies for achievement, 
including test scores, grades, wages, persistence rates, and completion rate.  We 
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concluded that wages are the best observable proxy available due to their direct link to 
labor market productivity, and hence knowledge and skills. 
Several econometric techniques that have been used to estimate achievement 
gains in higher education were then reviewed.  The key issues involved in the choice of 
technique were 1) the extent to which the method adequately controls for selection into 
college, 2) the method’s transparency to institutions and the general public, and 3) the 
practicality of implement the method in Texas using THECB data.  In light of these 
considerations, our recommendation was to use the matched applicant model of Dale and 
Kreuger (2002).   
Next, we used the matched applicant model to empirically estimate the 
achievement gains of students in Texas college, showing for comparison estimates 
obtained from both a naïve ordinal ranking (the Unmatched Ranking) and a ranking 
controlling for observables (the Conditional Ranking).  Our general finding is that there is 
little difference in achievement gains across institutions.  Most of the difference in the 
achievement gains of matriculates from Texas A&M vs. UT Pan Am, for example, is due 
to the types of students attending those schools and not relative institutional differences. 
Finally, we turned to a general policy discussion of achievement gain measures in 
higher education.  Here, we argued that for an achievement gain measure to be used for 
policy-making purposes, it should have two properties: the outcome considered must 
capture all components of knowledge and skills imparted by colleges, and the 
methodology must account for selection into colleges.  Otherwise colleges might have the 
incentive to pursue perverse policies to artificially inflate their achievement gain scores.  
We also argued that for a achievement gain measure to be practically applied in the 
policy arena, it must be precisely estimated and respond to interventions in a timely 
manner.    
In the abstract, achievement gain measures could be used for meaningful policy-
making purposes.  Published annually, they could allow individual colleges to monitor 
their own progress and compare themselves to peer institutions.  Funding could also be 
tied to either the level of achievement gains, or to changes in that level, thereby creating 
incentives for schools to improve.  In practice, however, currently available achievement 
gain measures are not sufficient for these purposes. 
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In light of the discoveries made in this report, we make the following policy 
recommendations for the state of Texas: 
 
1. At best, the methods used in this report for measuring achievement gains in 
institutes of higher education should be a starting point for further research.  
We do not recommend using these methods to institute an annual value-added 
ranking of colleges in Texas for monitoring purposes and we urge particular 
caution against using these methods to develop a “pay-for-performance” type 
policy.  We present some evidence that value-added differences across Texas colleges 
are small.  This, in and of itself, is important information that could - and likely 
should - be made public.  However, as the estimates are imprecise, we cannot in 
general distinguish the quality of one college over the other and we therefore believe 
it would be inappropriate to form policies using these methods.  Moreover, tying 
funding to such measures is tantamount to randomly allocating funds across colleges.  
In future research, we plan to use more refined econometric techniques (i.e., 
Instrumental Variables estimation) in an attempt to make achievement gains estimates 
more precise. 
 
2. We do not recommend the wholesale implementation of testing at the higher 
education level.  At first glance, standardized tests appear to be an ideal way to 
measure the entirety of the set of skills and knowledge acquired in higher education.  
But, upon closer inspection, it is unclear that a standardized test could be designed 
that would test both general and specific knowledge.  There are well designed exams 
of general skills, like the CLA, and there are appropriate exams for testing specific 
skills for some majors, like the ETS subject tests.  However, what is needed is a way 
to combine these two distinct aspects of educational achievement that is meaningfully 
comparable across students with vastly different goals and career plans.  
 
3. We do recommend the Coordinating Board explore other, more qualitative, 
methods to measure and increase achievement gains by schools.  One such 
method would be a program of institutional peer review.  Under such a program, the 
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Board could set up an exchange of faculty members across colleges to sit in on 
classes, discuss teaching techniques with faculty in their field, and evaluate the 
academic goals and standards of the peer school.  Emphasis could be placed on 
sharing ideas for academic advancement and increasing the achievement gains of 
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Annual Earnings, $ $37,707 ($24,633) $27515 ($26,365)
% Graduated within 8 years 68.57% (46.43%) 62.18% (48.49%)
% Persisted into 2nd year of college 86.55% (34.12%) 84.59% (36.1%)
Demographic Variables
SAT (or converted ACT) score 1026.16 (17.8) 1033.41 (18.2)
% Black 10.41% 9.82%
% Hispanic 18.86% 18.84%
% White 64.92% 64.82%
% Male 43.56% 44.87%
% Eligible for Free Lunch 13.39% 13.26%
% At Risk of Not Graduating 10.71% 10.69%
# of AP courses taken 1.01 1.04
H.S. Courses as Senior, % enrolled
English as a 2nd Language (ESL) 0.14% 0.18%
Gifted and Talented Program 25.51% 25.77%
Calculus 25.19% 25.55%
Pre-Caculus 24.02% 23.86%





Table 1   Summary Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation)
Notes: Earnings are the sum of the 4 quarterly earnings 8 years after graduating high school.  Other HS courses not 
displayed are used as controls.











Variables Coefficient Rank Coefficient Rank Coefficient Rank
TAMU - Galveston `-0.221** 6 `-0.144** 10 0.069 1
Sul Ross State University `-0.386** 21 `-0.18** 15 0.047 2
Texas State University `-0.253** 10 `-0.105** 7 0.022 3
Stephen F. Austin State Univ. `-0.241** 9 `-0.119** 8 0.012 4
Texas Women's University `-0.254** 11 `-0.081* 3 0.011 5
Midwestern State University `-0.423** 25 `-0.256** 29 0.002 6
Angelo State University `-0.429** 26 `-0.249** 27 0.0001 7
Texas A&M University -- 1 -- 1 -- 8
University of Noth Texas `-0.3** 12 `-0.173** 14 -0.018 9
Texas Tech University `-0.166** 5 `-0.09** 5 -0.023 10
Univ. of Houston - Downtown `-0.436** 27 `-0.213** 21 -0.024 11
Tarleton State University `-0.356** 17 `-0.192** 17 -0.027 12
UT - Tyler -0.136 4 -0.087 4 -0.028 13
UT - Austin `-0.083** 2 `-0.067** 2 -0.038 14
UT San Antonio `-0.397** 22 `-0.202** 18 -0.052 15
Sam Houston State Univ. `-0.301** 13 `-0.14** 9 -0.061 16
TAMU - International `-0.319** 14 -0.1 6 -0.065 17
TAMU - Corpus Chirsti `-0.372** 19 `-0.207** 20 -0.071 18
Prarie View A&M University `-0.538** 29 `-0.255** 28 -0.071 19
UT - Pan American `-0.436** 28 `-0.228** 24 -0.073 20
UT - El Paso `-0.42** 24 `-0.244** 26 -0.108 21
University of Houston `-0.239** 8 `-0.161** 12 `-0.116** 22
TAMU - Kingsville `-0.411** 23 `-0.206** 19 -0.131 23
Lamar University `-0.339** 15 `-0.229** 25 `-0.164* 24
TAMU -  Commerce `-0.348** 16 `-0.191** 16 -0.166 25
UT - Arlington `-0.224** 7 `-0.165** 13 `-0.168** 26
UT - Permian Basin `-0.371** 18 `-0.214** 22 -0.17 27
West Texas A&M Univ. `-0.374** 20 `-0.217** 23 `-0.198* 28
UT - Dallas `-0.13** 3 `-0.16** 11 `-0.22* 29
Texas Southern University `-0.634** 30 `-0.37** 30 `-0.227* 30
SAT score / 100 -- 0.0004 0.0002
At Risk of not Graduating HS -- `-0.045** `-0.042**
Low Income in HS -- `-0.054** `-0.054**
Male -- `0.069** `0.072**
Constant `9.626** `9.307** `9.612**
Student Level HS Controls No Yes Yes
High School Level Controls No Yes Yes
College Major Controls No Yes Yes
Matched App. Group Controls No No Yes
Experience Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 45657 45657 45657
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.13 0.14
Unconditional 
Ranking Conditional  Ranking
Matched Applicant 
Ranking
Table 2 - Earnings Models - Log earnings regressions, including dummy variables for 4-year Public 
schools in Texas
1 2 3
Notes: Includes all TX high 1998 & 1999 HS graduates enrolled in a TX 4-yr public college, that took the SAT or ACT, and earned over 
$2000 8 yrs after graduating HS.  The excluded school is Texas A&M.  Student level controls include HS courses taken and ethnicity.  HS 
level contols include county average income, unemployment rate, population, and crime rate. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 
10% level, respectively.  TAMU = Texas A&M University.  UT = University of Texas  
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Variables Coefficient Rank Coefficient Rank Coefficient Rank
Prarie View A&M University `-0.142** 12 `-0.044** 5 0.086 1
UT - Permian Basin `-0.174** 19 `-0.129** 23 0.075 2
Univ. of Houston - Downtown `-0.177** 22 `-0.058** 10 0.064 3
TAMU - Corpus Chirsti `-0.11** 9 `-0.058** 9 0.057 4
TAMU - Kingsville `-0.183** 23 `-0.099** 18 0.041 5
Texas State University `-0.087** 6 `-0.041** 4 0.012 6
UT - Austin 0.009 1 -0.006 2 0.008 7
UT - Dallas `-0.053** 4 `-0.051** 6 0.004 8
Texas A&M University -- 2 -- 1 -- 9
Texas Tech University `-0.042** 3 -0.01 3 -0.004 10
University of Houston `-0.096** 8 `-0.067** 11 -0.007 11
Texas Women's University `-0.093** 7 `-0.054** 8 -0.008 12
TAMU - International `-0.177** 21 `-0.1** 19 -0.013 13
University of Noth Texas `-0.126** 11 `-0.089** 14 -0.024 14
Texas Southern University `-0.21** 28 `-0.112** 21 -0.032 15
UT - Pan American `-0.22** 29 `-0.133** 26 -0.033 16
Sam Houston State Univ. `-0.163** 15 `-0.097** 17 -0.036 17
UT - El Paso `-0.163** 16 `-0.096** 16 -0.042 18
Lamar University `-0.126** 10 `-0.07** 12 -0.044 19
Angelo State University `-0.177** 20 `-0.108** 20 -0.048 20
Midwestern State University `-0.164** 17 `-0.093** 15 -0.049 21
UT San Antonio `-0.206** 27 `-0.137** 27 `-0.065** 22
UT - Arlington `-0.161** 14 `-0.13** 24 `-0.065* 23
TAMU - Galveston `-0.083** 5 `-0.053* 7 -0.07 24
Stephen F. Austin State Univ. `-0.196** 26 `-0.143** 28 `-0.081** 25
UT - Tyler `-0.166** 18 `-0.146** 29 -0.087 26
West Texas A&M Univ. `-0.15** 13 `-0.084** 13 `-0.091* 27
Tarleton State University `-0.191** 24 `-0.122** 22 `-0.092* 28
TAMU -  Commerce `-0.193** 25 `-0.13** 25 `-0.096* 29
Sul Ross State University `-0.258** 30 `-0.158** 30 `-0.209** 30
SAT score / 100 -- `0.001** `0.001**
At Risk of not Graduating HS -- `-0.03** `-0.029**
Low Income in HS -- `-0.045** `-0.044**
Male -- `-0.045** `-0.044**
Constant `0.942** `0.822** `0.885**
Student Level HS Controls No Yes Yes
High School Level Controls No Yes Yes
College Major Controls No Yes Yes
Matched App. Group Controls No No Yes
Observations 65305 65305 65305
Adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.08 0.08
1 2 3
Notes: Includes all Texas high school graduates in the 1998 and 1999 cohorts that enrolled in a Texas 4 year public college and took 
either the SAT or the ACT.  The excluded school is Texas A&M.  Student level controls include HS courses taken and ethnicity.  High 
School level contols include county average income, unemployment rate, population, and crime rate. ** and * indicate significance at the 
5% and 10% level, respectively.  TAMU = Texas A&M University.  UT = University of Texas
Table 3 - Persistence Rate Models - Probits predicting the probablitiy of persisting into the 2nd year, 
including dummy variables for 4-year Public schools in Texas
Unconditional 




Variables Coefficient Rank Coefficient Rank Coefficient Rank
TAMU - International `-0.364** 22 `-0.19** 11 0.048 1
Sul Ross State University `-0.479** 28 `-0.286** 27 0.019 2
Prarie View A&M University `-0.41** 25 `-0.169** 7 0.006 3
Texas A&M University -- 1 -- 1 -- 4
TAMU - Kingsville `-0.397** 24 `-0.214** 15 -0.031 5
TAMU - Galveston `-0.184** 5 `-0.128** 5 -0.027 5
UT - Austin `-0.044** 2 `-0.062** 2 `-0.033* 7
TAMU - Corpus Chirsti `-0.274** 8 `-0.167** 6 -0.038 8
Sam Houston State Univ. `-0.294** 12 `-0.179** 10 -0.055 9
Texas State University `-0.202** 6 `-0.125** 4 `-0.057** 10
UT - Pan American `-0.439** 26 `-0.236** 20 -0.063 11
Texas Tech University `-0.163** 3 `-0.105** 3 `-0.068** 12
Stephen F. Austin State Univ. `-0.286** 10 `-0.197** 14 `-0.085** 13
Tarleton State University `-0.295** 13 `-0.192** 13 -0.092 14
UT - El Paso `-0.461** 27 `-0.303** 28 -0.093 15
Midwestern State University `-0.352** 19 `-0.224** 18 -0.094 16
Texas Women's University `-0.3** 14 `-0.219** 16 -0.098 17
University of Houston `-0.326** 15 `-0.243** 24 `-0.106** 18
Texas Southern University `-0.598** 30 `-0.377** 30 `-0.111* 19
UT - Dallas `-0.183** 4 `-0.172** 9 `-0.115* 20
University of Noth Texas `-0.287** 11 `-0.222** 17 `-0.118** 21
UT San Antonio `-0.386** 23 `-0.242** 23 `-0.119** 22
UT - Arlington `-0.327** 16 `-0.256** 25 `-0.13** 23
TAMU -  Commerce `-0.344** 18 `-0.237** 21 `-0.136* 24
Angelo State University `-0.36** 21 `-0.24** 22 `-0.137** 25
Univ. of Houston - Downtown `-0.565** 29 `-0.319** 29 `-0.143** 26
West Texas A&M Univ. `-0.335** 17 `-0.225** 19 `-0.15** 27
Lamar University `-0.357** 20 `-0.26** 26 `-0.152** 28
UT - Permian Basin `-0.279** 9 `-0.191** 12 -0.165 29
UT - Tyler `-0.205** 7 `-0.17** 8 `-0.277* 30
SAT score / 100 -- `0.002** `0.002**
At Risk of not Graduating HS -- `-0.04** `-0.037**
Low Income in HS -- `-0.065** `-0.064**
Male -- `-0.11** `-0.107**
Constant `0.847** `0.678** `0.772**
Student Level HS Controls No Yes Yes
High School Level Controls No Yes Yes
College Major Controls No Yes Yes
Matched App. Group Controls No No Yes
Observations 65305 65305 65305
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.15 0.16
1 2 3
Notes: Includes all Texas high school graduates in the 1998 and 1999 cohorts that enrolled in a Texas 4 year public college and took 
either the SAT or the ACT.  The excluded school is Texas A&M.  Student level controls include HS courses taken and ethnicity.  High 
School level contols include county average income, unemployment rate, population, and crime rate. ** and * indicate significance at the 
5% and 10% level, respectively.  TAMU = Texas A&M University.  UT = University of Texas
Table 4 - Graduation Rate Models - Probits predicting the probablitiy of graduating within 8 years of 
enrolling, including dummy variables for 4-year Public schools in Texas
Unconditional 






School Earnings Graduation Perrsistence
TAMU - Galveston 1 5 24
Sul Ross State University 2 2 30
Texas State University 3 10 6
Stephen F. Austin State Univ. 4 13 25
Texas Women's University 5 17 12
Midwestern State University 6 16 21
Angelo State University 7 25 20
Texas A&M University 8 4 9
University of Noth Texas 9 21 14
Texas Tech University 10 12 10
Univ. of Houston - Downtown 11 26 3
Tarleton State University 12 14 28
UT - Tyler 13 30 26
UT - Austin 14 7 7
UT San Antonio 15 22 22
Sam Houston State Univ. 16 9 17
TAMU - International 17 1 13
TAMU - Corpus Chirsti 18 8 4
Prarie View A&M University 19 3 1
UT - Pan American 20 11 16
UT - El Paso 21 15 18
University of Houston 22 18 11
TAMU - Kingsville 23 5 5
Lamar University 24 28 19
TAMU -  Commerce 25 24 29
UT - Arlington 26 23 23
UT - Permian Basin 27 29 2
West Texas A&M Univ. 28 27 27
UT - Dallas 29 20 8
Texas Southern University 30 19 15
Value-Added Measure
Table 5 - College Rankings, by Value Added Measure                    
(rankings determined from Matched Applicant Models)
